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The Precautionary Principle: its Implications in 
Capture Fisheries Management 
S. M. Garcia 
Fishery Resources and Environment Division. Fisheries Department, 
FAO, Rome, Italy 
'Conservation and management both stem from value judgements 
made by society, not science.' 
R. L. Edwards (1988)" 
ABSTRACT 
The paper attempts to clarify the research, management and legal 
implications of a potential application of the Precautionary Principle to 
capture fisheries, particularly in the international context. In the process, 
the paper also looks at related issues such as the burden of proof, the 
use of best available scientific evidence and technology, the reliance on 
prior scientific consensus, assimilative capacity and acceptable levels of 
impacts, etc., in the fishery context. It is argued that, if narrowly 
interpreted, the precautionary principle could lead to socio-economic 
havoc. I f  reasonably interpreted. however, the Principle offers a golden 
opportunity to progress towards sustainable fisheries development and 
suggestions are made for the implementation of precautionary ap- 
proaches in fisheries management. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Fisheries management practice has evolved slowly during the last half 
century, constantly lagging behind theory. Progress achieved since the 
first FAO Technical Committee on Fisheries in 1945 has been 
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insufficient largely due to competition and expansion in an open access 
context as well as inadequate research and institutions.’ While tradi- 
tional management practice has still to improve, new aspects related to 
environmental conservation are emerging which may require an ac- 
celeration of the process of evolution of fisheries management and a 
broadening of its scope to take non-fishery users concerns into account. 
Part XII of UNCLOS ‘Protection and preservation of the marine 
environment’ does not contain detailed instruments for implementation 
of the conservation of the marine ecosystem, but it stresses that States 
have the ‘duty to protect and preserve the environment’ from pollution. 
Burke2 stresses, however, that if ecosystem conservation requires 
measures for the fisheries sector, under Article 192, States will have to 
apply such measures as provided by the fisheries provisions of 
UNCLOS and to strike a balance between the environmental and 
fisheries provisions to ensure sustainable exploitation. 
Environmental concern has increased drastically in fisheries, with the 
World Conference on Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972, the work 
of the ‘Brundtland’ Commission from 1984 to 19873 and the prepara- 
tions for the UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio 
de Janeiro, 1992. This concern, which was already apparent in the FAO . 
Technical Conference on Fishery Development and Management, 
Vancouver, 1973, and the FAO World Conference on Fisheries 
Management and Development, Rome, 1984, was exacerbated by the i 
international conflict on large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing in the high 
seas at the end of the 1980s and the related Resolution 44/225 of the 
UN General Assembly in December 1989. 
There is a worldwide trend towards preventive approaches to 
management of renewable resources (cf. IUCN4) and such approaches 
have been advocated in the past for fishery management: but rarely 
implemented. As the global concern for the environment is gaining 
momentum in fisheries, one can expect that the principles adopted at 
international level for environmental protection, such as the Precau- 
tionary Principle, may tie progressively forced on the fisheries systems. 
The wide adoption of the Principle could change drastically the state of 
affairs in marine living resources conservation and could offer an 
opportunity to improve fisheries management and ensure sustainable 
fisheries development. Its careless generalization to fisheries could, 
however, lead to economic and social chaos in the fishing industry. 
The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to review the available 
information on the Precautionary Principle, to clarify the implication of 
its potential application to fisheries and its relationships with conven- 
tional management approaches. The paper addresses this issue mainly 
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in the context of international fora but many of the implications are 
also relevant at national level. The following sections will; (1) describe 
the Precautionary Principle; (2) analyse its scientific, technical and legal 
implications for fisheries; and (3) propose elements for precautionary 
fisheries management strategies. 
2 THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
The Precautionary Principle seems to have existed for a long time in 
national laws related to human health and, for instance, in the 
regulations of pharmaceutical industries. It seems to have been then 
progressively invoked in relation to pollution and its impact on human 
health and, later, its impact on the environment. As environmental 
concern and conscience grew, preoccupation for human safety has been 
progressively extended to human environment and to other animal 
species and from a national to an international context. This has led to 
a growing reference to the Principle, often without much analysis of the 
practical implications. 
In international environmental softlaw, the Precautionary Principle 
emerged as a recognition of the uncertainty involved in impact 
assessments and management and in particular, in the determination of 
the future consequences (and associated costs) of present decisions. It is 
related to the central issues of inter-generational equity-our respon- 
sibility towards future generations-and long-term discount rates and is 
particularly relevant when uncertainty is high and potential conse- 
quences of decisions could affect the survival of humanity? By 
comparison, traditional fisheries management deals with intra- 
generational equity-and allocation of resources between the present 
users. The Principle was apparently referred to in relation to pollution 
prevention in the early 1980s in Germany (‘Vorsorgeprinzip”, and 
applied to issues related to the ozone layer, the greenhouse effect and 
the conservation of nature. It has touched indirectly on fisheries 
through the International Conventions on dumping at sea (Paris and 
Oslo Convention, Marpol) in relation to pollution by fishing vessels. 
It has been recently addressed for fisheries in relation to the actual or 
suspected impacts of the activity on coastal habitats and ecosystems, 
endangered species, genetics and biodiversity. In most cases this was 
done only implicitly. Of particular relevance is the implicit emergence 
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of this Principle in the discussions of the Preparatory Commissions of 
the UN Conference on Environment and Development on Oceans and 
particularly in the three Action Programmes on coastal areas. high seas 
and marine living resources. The International Conference for the 
Protection of the North Sea (London, November 1987; The Hague, 
March 1990) used it explicitly in decisions regarding coastal States 
jurisdiction, habitats, species and fisheries, including pollution from 
ships. 
In order to understand better its potential implications for fisheries, 
the terms of its declaration could be adapted to fisheries, for illustra- 
tion, replacing the words ‘substances’ by ‘fishing practices’ and deleting 
specific reference to the North Sea. (Such ‘transposition’ from environ- 
mental to fisheries softlaw, which may be considered abusive to some 
readers is, unfortunately, what is presently happening.) This Precau- 
tionary Principle would read as follows: 
Accepting that, in order to protect a marine area from possibly 
damaging effects of the most dangerous fishing practices and gears, a 
precautionary approach is necessary which may require action to 
control fishing activities even before a causal link has been establ- 
ished by absolutely clear scientific evidence.. . 
States accept the principle of safeguarding the marine ecosystem by 
reducing dangerous fishing practices, by the use of the best technol- 
ogy available and other appropriate measures. This applies especially 
when there is reason to assume that certain damage or harmful 
effects on the living resources are likely to be caused by such fishing 
practices and technologies, even where there is no scientific evidence 
to prove a causal link between practices and effects (the principle of 
precautionary action). 
The UN Resolution 44/225 on large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing in 
the high seas (December 1989) gives an example of expression of the 
Precautionary Principle for international fisheries. Although not as 
stringent as the original proposals put forward by the countries 
promoting it, the Resolution is a good example of the type of approach 
which might be internationally agreed to in the future. It is also likely 
that the strategy and principles behind this resolution will be used again 
in the future, both in the high seas and inside EEZs. After having 
expressed concern about the importance of the fleets, the length of the 
nets, their mode of operation, their potential impact on anadromous 
and highly migratory species, their by-catch, the concern of coastal 
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countries on the state of resources close to their EEZs, the Resolution 
recommends that: 
(a) a moratorium should be imposed on all. . . fishing.. . by 30 June 
1992; (b) immediate action should be taken to reduce 
progressively.. . fishing activities in the South Pacific region with a 
view to the cessation of such activities by July 1991 and (c) further 
expansion.. . i n  the North Pacific and all other high seas 
areas. . . should cease immediately. 
. . . such a measure will not be imposed in a region or, if imple- 
mented, can be lifted, should effective conservation and management 
measures be taken based upon statistically sound analysis to be made 
jointly by concerned parties. . . 
The Resolution recommended immediate action on the basis of 
‘concern’, in the absence of convincing evidence or scientific consensus 
and assuming therefore that driftnets have undesirable impacts unless 
shown otherwise. 
A major property of the Principle is that it inverses the course of 
action, requiring that measures are taken first and, subsequently, 
relaxed if research demonstrates convincingly that they are not neces- 
sary. It affects the relation between science and policy and between 
management and development by: (a) focusing the spotlight on 
scientific uncertainty and related risk in decision-making; (b) reverting 
the burden of proof on industry; and (c) giving priority to preventive 
management on crisis solving. It is a reaction to the present situation 
that environmentalists consider unbalanced in favour of the economic 
sectors and short-term socio-economic considerations. If narrowly 
interpreted, without reference to social and economic considerations, it 
could reverse the situation in favour of the environment and of 
non-consumptive users giving to them the benefit of the doubt and 
safeguarding all their interests even in the worst case assumption. The 
latter would imply that all risks are to be taken by economic activities. 
The problem is not new to fisheries. James8 wrote that the managers’ 
dilemma was that ‘by always leaning backwards in regulation, giving to 
the resources the benefit of the doubt (emphasis added), he might come 
up with reasonable assurance of protecting the resource, except that the 
economic survival of thousands of individuals, hundreds of communities 
and dozens of countries may be affeted by the administrative action 
taken’. 
In the following sections distinction should be made between the 
Precautionary Principle and precautionary approaches or measures. 
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The 'Principle' will refer to the 'hard line' rule proposed for manage- 
ment of highly polluting activities. The 'approaches' will refer to the 
practical ways and sets of measures which are precautionary in nature 
but may lead to more realistic application in fisheries. 
'r .. 
3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
3.1 Implications for research 
3.1.1 Best scientiJc evidence 
The Kristiana Conference, in 1901, just before the creation of the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, endorsed the 
principle of scientific enquiry as a basis for rational exploitation of the 
sea. The same principle was also agreed on at the International 
Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, 
hosted by FAO in Rome in 1955. It was finally integrated in the United 
Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea, adopted in 1982. Prior 
scientific consensus (on cause-effect relationships and potential conse- 
quences of action) has been the basis for action in international fisheries 
management and will remain one of the most neutral and peaceful ways 
to reduce costs of interaction between nations and user-groups. 
In modern fishery management systems, scientists are asked to: (1) 
determine the theoretical potential production of a stock (usually 
equated to MSY); (2) calculate the corresponding level of fishing effort, 
as a benchmark level not to be surpassed; (3) determine the appropriate 
size at first capture before which fish should not be caught in significant 
numbers; (4) recommend ways in which the above can be achieved 
(mesh sizes, closed areas, closed seasons) and the bio-economic and 
technical trade-offs involved; ( 5 )  assess the effects of fishing and 
forecast impacts of management options. 
Despite its level of development, particularly in the northern 
hemisphere, fishery science has played only a limited and advisory role 
in the complex decision-making process of fisheries development.'.' The 
limitations of the data, models and paradigm are being progressively 
recognized" together with the uncertainty unavoidably attached to any 
scientific assessment. Raising the research standard further to model 
ecosystem behaviour under combined environmental and fishing stress 
and considering socio-economic effects implies data, understanding and 
financial and human resources which, in many instances, would be 
. 
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unrealistic. However, research can contribute substantially to the 
reduction of management uncertainty by: 
Improving the statistical power of the methods used for assessing 
the biological and economic parameters, testing their sensitivity to 
data errors and systematically producing estimates of bias and 
precision in the derived parameters.” 
Expanding the range of available models towards multispecies 
and ecosystem models, taking environmental variability into 
account. 
Testing the sensitivity of models used for fisheries and ecosystem 
management to the uncertainties in their parameters and in their 
functional structure. In particular, testing routinely the impact of 
such uncertainties on the performance of management. 
Analysing a range of possible options, with a range of models, 
showing the likely direction and, if possible, magnitude of the 
biological and socio-economic consequences of these options as 
well as the level and direction of the uncertainty (risk 
assessment). 
Experimenting with management systems as advocated by Wal- 
ters and Hilborn’ many years ag0.I3 
Improving fishing gear and practices. Work must be done not only 
on better ways to use gears but on the development of better gear 
(square mesh trawls, turtle and by-catch excluder devices, biodeg- 
radable nets and pots, etc. .  .) with better selectivity and less 
environmental impact. 
UNCLOS requires ‘the best scientific evidence’ when designing and 
adopting management and conservation measures. It provides that in 
EEZs it shall be taken into account (emphasis added) by the coastal 
State (article 62) and in the high seas, measures are designed on it 
(emphasis added) (Article 119). Although the obligation seems to be 
less stringent for the coastal States in its area of exclusive jurisdiction 
than for States cooperating in the high seas, the requirement for 
scientific evidence is clear. The discussion by BurkeZ of the UNGA 
44/225 in this respect highlights some of the problems. UNCLOS is 
satisfied with the ‘best available evidence’. It does not define the quality 
of the evidence required in any quantitative manner and ‘does not 
necessarily place a great or imposing burden that must be discharged 
before the necessary conservation measures can be taken.. . The ‘best 
available’ standard even permits the use of poor evidence to justify 
conservation measures, if that evidence is the best available?z 
UNCLOS, however, also does not indicate what should be done if 
. 
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there is no scientific information available. One would assume that the 
spirit of the text is that such scientific information should be urgently 
collected but this does not preclude measures being taken in the 
meantime. UNCLOS does not provide criteria on how to decide what is 
‘the best’ scientific information if scientific conflicting results are 
available, neither does it give guidance on how to operate in the 
absence of the scientific consensus which UNCLOS, implicitly, assumes. 
In such case, the Precautionary Principle would ensure that action is not 
deferred sine die. (In the driftnet issue, such a procedure was Set-up 
through international scientific monitoring but the consensus on the 
implications of the results of the programme was never reached.) 
The UNGA Resolution 44/225 on large scale pelagic driftnet fishing 
recognizes, in its preamble ‘that any regulatory measures.. . should take 
account of (emphasis added) the best scientific evidence available and 
analysis’, using for a high seas problem, the weaker wording that 
UNCLOS provided for EEZ resources management. The purpose of 
this might have been to avoid the constraint that measures would have 
to be based on (emphasis added) the evidence available. 
The introduction of the Precautionary Principle in fisheries could 
appear, therefore, an attempt to ‘fill the gaps’ in UNCLOS, preventing 
the absence of scientific data or consensus opening a loophole leading 
to ‘laissez-faire’ management and development strategies. UNCLOS 
does not foresee, however, that an existing fishery could be closed if 
data are not available. The Precautionary Principle has been criticized 
by the GESAMP Steering Group on Scientifically Based Strategies for 
Marine Environmental Protection and Management14 as ‘the acceptance 
of suspicion rather than scientific evidence as sufficient to introduce 
controls’. Contrary to the usual rule for crime regulations, potential 
culprits are considered guilty pending proof to the contrary. It should 
be hardly debatable that, in fisheries, when scientific data are available 
together with a monitoring and-management system, the basic require- 
ment of UNCLOS should prevail, e.g. that decisions be taken on the 
basis of the best scientific evidence available. 
3.1.2 Burden of proof 
The burden of proof is traditionally on research and management with 
the rare exceptions where scientific work has been used to limit the 
development programmes on new fisheries. They have to demonstrate 
that harm is being done to the stock before measures can be imposed 
on industry. History has shown that, because of the continuous 
bargaining between management and industry (and related socio- 
economic pressures) the ‘proofs’ may be arguable and their impact on 
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decisions often far from satisfactory.’ The adoption of the Precaution- 
ary Principle would imply a fundamental reversal of the burden of 
proof, placing on those actors (group of fishermen, countries) who 
claim that no action is required the onus of proving that what they 
intend to do will not lead to ‘unacceptable’ effects on the resources. 
As an example, in relation to the conditional re-opening of the large 
scale pelagic driftnet fishery, it was proposed to the UN General 
Assembly in 19901’ that: 
Unless joint assessments by all concerned. . . of sound scientific data 
from a specific large scale driftnet fishery concludes that there are no 
unacceptable impacts by that fishery, the conditions for relief of the 
moratoria.. . are not met (the subjective words have been underlined 
by the present author). 
This proposal puts on the fishing nations the burden to prove that, if 
allowed, driftnets would not have an unacceptable impact, leaving 
implicitly to the other nations the right to accept or not that proof. This 
is in line with the Precautionary Principle which requires States to take 
preventive or corrective action even in the absence of sufficient 
scientific evidence of a causal link between a suspected factor and the 
adverse effects observed (or even before any effect is observed at all). 
This was confirmed by UNGA Resolution 46/215 of December 1991 
on large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing which called for action against this 
type of fishery on the basis that: ‘the international community (which) 
have reviewed the best available data.. .have failed to conclude that 
this practice had no adverse impact.. . and that..  . evidence has not 
demonstrated that the impact can be fully prevented’. 
Another example can be found in the EEC Council Regulation 
345/92 of 27/1/1992 which regulates the use and the length of driftnets 
(limited to 2.5 km) in EEC waters. Article 9a grants a derogation until 
31/12/1993 to some vessels allowing them. It states, however, that: ‘the 
derogation shall expire on the above date, unless the Council, acting by 
a qualified majority on a proposal by the Commission, decides to 
extend it in light of the scientific evidence showing the absence of 
ecological risk linked thereto’. This indicates clearly that, unless proved 
otherwise, driftnets of more that 2.5 km are considered harmful. 
Finally, the form in which the ICES Advisory Committee on 
Fisheries Management (ACFM) delivers its advice gives another 
example of precautionary approaches:I6 for ‘stocks where, at present, it 
is not possible to carry out any analytical assessment with an 
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acceptable reliability, AFCM shall indicate precautionary TACS to 
reduce the danger of excessive efforts being exerted on these stocks‘. 
3.1.3 The role o-f statistics 
The UNGA resolution 44/225 requires ’sound statistical analysis‘ and 
this new terminology could be considered as an attempt to clarify the 
concept of ‘best’, equating it with ‘statistically sound’. Relations 
between statistics and the Precautionary Principle have been discussed 
by Gray’’ who welcomed the adoption of the Precautionary Principle 
for environmental law but worried about the fact that it implies that ‘it 
is no longer necessary to have scientific facts to back up environmental 
legislation as one can simply “have reasons to assume” that an effect 
can take place’ to justify a management decision. He warns on the risk 
for scientific objectivity if proper statistical procedures are not the basis 
for the assessments. He concluded that ‘the Precautionary Principle 
should not be part of science since, by definition, it does not rely on 
scientific evidence’. 
The advantage of referring to statistics is that it offers a way of using 
well-established mathematical techniques and tests to decide what 
information is ‘best’ on statistical grounds. Bringing statistics into the 
picture would force scientists and decision-making systems to recognize 
and measure explicitly the levels of uncertainty and the risks attached 
to the decisions. 
There are, however, also problems with statistics. There are many 
types of them (parametric, non-parametric, geostatistics). Statistics for 
spatial analysis are still to be improved. Biological distributions tend to 
be continuous (rarely random) and stratification is usually not fully 
satisfactory. Under these conditions, the use of many statistical tests is 
questionable. Separating the ‘signal’ from the ‘blank noise’ in a data set 
and distinguishing fishing effects from environmental ones is, in many 
instances, a nightmare. Obtaining consensus on statistical analysis might 
therefore not always be easier than on scientific evidence. If such 
agreement on the sound statistical analysis would have to be obtained 
by consensus, one single country could easily block the process. The 
lack of international agreement on the results of the joint driftnet 
fishery research programme illustrates this difficulty. 
3.2 Implications for management 
Human beings are not ‘prudent predators’ because their intervention is 
disjointed, and the feedback controls that they respond to are in good 
part independent of the natural resource ecosystem? Their activities, 
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not sufficiently controlled by natural signals of resources stress. can 
continue despite environmental degradation with potentially irrever- 
sible effects. One should recognize, however, that fishermen, whose 
livelihood depends on the living resources, are more sensitive to natural 
feedback control than most land-based activities. Notwithstanding, the 
hard facts demonstrate without any doubt that such feedback has been, 
in many instances, insufficient to avoid excessive stress on fisheries 
stocks, with severe ecological and economic consequences. Improve- 
ments are therefore necessary and the following sections will look at 
ways in which the Precautionary Principle could help. 
Hey'7 states that a precautionary approach to environmental protec- 
tion should be based on clean production methods and best available 
technology, comprehensive methods of environmental and economic 
assessment, scientific and economic research towards better under- 
standing and analysis of options, appropriate legal, administrative and 
technical procedures. If taken out of their precautionary context, as 
described above, the elements of the approach look very traditional, at 
least to fisheries management specialists. 
3.2.1 Management under uncertainty 
It is obvious that fisheries management could certainly be improved. 
Many important stocks are too close or even below their MSY level, 
leading to instability. Many have ecologically or economically collapsed. 
The situation raises particular concern in the high seas'' but is far from 
satisfactory in all EEZs.'O Management failure results essentially from 
the common property nature of fisheries and the lack of effective will to 
control fishing effort levels directly in the absence of an explicit 
allocation of resources. In a fishery system with an efficient resources 
allocation scheme, both research and management would have per- 
formed better. Allocation can, however, be achieved only through 
lengthy and politically difficult processes of evolution of property and 
user rights, and the resulting deficiencies and uncertainty must be faced. 
Perring9 notes that 'there is no consensus on what the principle 
means for decision-making under uncertainty'. In general, the Precau- 
tionary Principle is invoked when a negative impact on man-and, by 
extension, on the ecosystem-is suspected and when the options or 
even the survival of future human generations are at stake. It should be 
obvious that fisheries do not threaten the future of humanity even 
though their mismanagement may severely affect the livelihood of 
coastal communities. There can be no doubt, however, that fisheries 
have an impact on the ecosystem and its species, if only by reducing 
target species abundance, age structure and reproductive potential. 
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Some involuntary impacts on associated species will also occur and 
impacts on habitats. although limited. cannot be excluded for some 
mobile gears (beach seines, trawls. etc.). A major difference. however, 
between fisheries and pollution (for which the Principle was created) is 
that the survival of capture fisheries and aquaculture is directly 
dependent on the state of the environment (including the biodiversity) 
they exploit. This is not the case for, say, chemical industries dumping 
sewage into the coastal areas. 
The aquatic resources properties, their 'fluid' nature, the quality of 
the fishery data and the limits of scientific understanding lead to the 
existence of a certain level of uncertainty on the understanding of the 
ecosystem and on the scientific advice. This, in turn, implies some level 
of risk of error in management decisions aiming at maintaining the 
resources and the environment. The risk cannot be totally eliminated. 
One can easily assume that in a complex multi-resources and multi-user 
system the overall level of uncertainty in the parameters and the system 
itself is so high that a zero-risk strategy would imply no development at 
all. A strategy hardly viabie. 
If sustainable use is the objective, in order to produce a continuous 
flow of goods and services from the living aquatic resources, the 
Precautionary Principle can only aim at reducing detrimental impacts 
below some acceptable threshold and not at eliminating them al- 
together. It follows that the judgement will have to be based on 
scientific evidence and advice on what levels of impacts are acceptable, 
taking in due consideration the short- and long-term impacts and their 
socio-economic as well as ecological implications. 
3.2.2 Assimilative capacity and acceptable levels of impact 
The concept of assimilative capacity of the environment has generated 
heated debate in environmental protection. This concept implies that 
nature can absorb a certain quantity of pollution without significant 
effect. For .some industries it is important to estimate the assimilative 
capacity of the ocean and use it as a resource (i.e. for dumping wastes). 
According to Hey,I7 the concept also implies that science can determine 
the assimilative capacity and that management will be efficient enough 
to prevent negative effects and abuse. She states that this concept 
depends too much on short-term economic considerations and is not 
precautionary. One can easily see the concern when the assimilative 
capacity is defined in terms of radioactive wastes, heavy metals and 
other non-reversible impacts. 
The problem is significantly different with fisheries. Their purpose is 
to impact the resource and capture part of the natural productivity in 
u 
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order to extract food and revenues. The resources do have an 
'assimilative capacity' in terms of the fishing mortality they can stand. 
In a way, the Maximum Sustainable Yield could be considered a 
measure of the maximum assimilative capacity of a stock. The same 
concept can apply to a multispecies resource and to an ecosystem even 
though defining and measuring such 'capacity' is not a trivial issue. 
As the cause-effect relationship between fishing and the resources is 
obviously not questioned, the problem lies in (a) the degree of impact 
that could be allowed (e.g. the assimilative capacity) and (b) the 
discrimination of fishing impacts from environmental impacts whether 
natural (normal year-to-year climate fluctuations) or resulting from 
human activities (degradation and global climate change). 
3.2.3 Standards and criteria 
The Precautionary Principle is not formulated in absolute terms and it 
offers little guidance on how to apply it in practice. Better quantifica- 
tion and qualification are required and words such as: detrimental, 
substantial, significant, harmful, unacceptable, which are generally used 
in the various expressions of the Principle, need a more accurate 
definition. There is a whole range of degrees in each of these and other 
terms currently used and one of the major tasks for research and 
management will be to develop the agreement on standards, criteria 
and critical thresholds on which to base decisions. Criteria will be 
needed to face the requirements of management of the diversity of 
existing ecosystems and resources. Clarification is required, for ex- 
ample, on the concepts of sustainability (in a naturally variable context) 
and reversibility (for multi-equilibrium systems). Measures of ecological 
stress will also have to be agreed. The following examples illustrate the 
difficulty of establishing a set of coherent and credible criteria. 
With reference to the issue of by-catch, for example, MileP stressed 
the danger of setting criteria at excessively high levels, with the risk of 
crippling national industries beyond what is required to ensure long- 
term resources conservation, recalling that criteria established for high 
seas will tend to be proposed also for EEZs. This author cites a paper 
on driftnets, presented to the United Nations in 1991, and in which an 
'efficient harvest' is defined as the one which: 
(a) will ensure as far as practicable that human activities do not result 
in the decrease of any population of marine species below a level 
close to what ensures the greatest net annual increment or 
(b) will not catch numbers of either target or non-target species that 
will result in significant changes in the relationship among any of the 
key components of the marine ecosystem of which they are part. 
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The first criterion implies that populations are not decreased beyond 
their MSY abundance level where their natural turnover is the highest. 
This is in line with the original UNCLOS requirements and it has been 
shown, since then, that it is not biologically and economically advisable, 
in most cases, to extract the Maximum Sustainable Yield. For multi- 
species fisheries, however, it would require that all species be exploited 
below their MSY abundance and therefore that the overall level of 
exploitation be fixed at the lowest level required by the species with the 
lowest resilience. In a typical Mediterranean multispecies trawl fishery, 
where long-lived bottom species (e.g. seabreams and red mullets) are 
targeted together with short-lived pelagic (e.g. sardines), this would 
imply fishing sardines well below the possible level of harvest in order 
to meet the criterion for seabreams and mullets. The problem has been 
recognized in the report of the FAO Expert Consultation on Large 
Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing (FAO’’ para. 74). 
The second criterion implies that fishing does not disturb significantly 
the food chain. There are two problems there. First, the word 
‘significantly’ is subjective and the criterion gives no guidance on the 
basis of which a food chain disturbance is to be considered ‘significant’ 
or not. Second, applying fully the first criterion leads, in practice, to 
differential fishing, to a change in relative abundances of species and 
may very well affect the food chain. As a consequence, the second 
criterion is difficult to use in practice for many fisheries and may not 
even be coherent with the first one. 
It has been proposed respectively to the United Nations General 
Assembly (cited by MileP) and in the Report on Ecologically Sus- 
tainable Development of Fisheries (Australiaz0) that: 
The mortality inflicted on any target or non-target species. . . is 
unacceptable if it exceeds the level that would, when combined with 
other sources of mortality, result in a total level that is not 
sustainable by-the population in the long term. 
As data permits, fish management authorities set target species catch 
levels in accordance with the requirement that fishing does not 
exceed ecologically sustainable levels for both target and non-target 
species. . . 
Taking into account mortalities from all sources when assessing 
fisheries impacts is a prerequisite (including natural mortality, indirect 
fishing mortality as by-catch, direct fishing mortality as target, etc.). 
Estimating drop-out mortality is a very demanding task but assuming it 
is feasible, a problem remains with the term ‘sustainable’ in both 
proposals. 
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The production model theory says that resources are sustainable (in 
the sense of being able to regenerate themselves) at various levels of 
abundance depending on the level of harvest. In other words, a stock 
can reproduce itself, for a long period of time, and be considered 
therefore sustainable, at high (virgin state), medium (MSY level) and 
even low level of abundance. As stocks are fished down, their 
variability and the risk of collapse increases. But, in theory, and in 
practice, stocks can be said to be sustainable even at fairly low levels. It 
has been agreed in UNCLOS that stocks should not be exploited 
beyond their MSY level of abundance and this could be considered a 
bottom line criterion for stock ‘sustainability’, remembering, however, 
that stocks’ MSY vary with environment and that, even when abun- 
dance is above the MSY level, the risk of collapse is not nil (Lauree"). 
From an ecosystem point of view, if balance between ecosystem 
components must be maintained, minimizing by-catch or using ex- 
tremely selective gears might not be necessarily the best solution (with 
the proviso that discards be limited to a strict minimum). GarrodZ2 
suggested that in multispecies management, a reasonable strategy 
would be to exploit all species proportionally to their abundance in 
order to maintain the overall structure. More work is certainly required 
on this matter before objective guidance can be given. 
New criteria, not foreseen in UNCLOS, are required if species 
sustainability is to be ensured at low risk of collapse. They would have 
to refer to, for example, minimum reproductive biomass, safe biological 
limits, optimum recruitment levels, maximum statistical probability of 
ecological or economical collapse, especially in areas of high environ- 
mental variability (upwellings) or for particularly low resilience species. 
New criteria are also needed for precautionary ecosystem manage- 
ment, related to global stress indicators, resilience factors, habitat 
conditions, etc. Some of the required principles can be found in the 
management charter of the Commission for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) and in the IUCN 
Strategy for S~stainability:~ 
-minimize conversion of critical ecosystems to ‘lower’ conditions, 
-balance habitat conversion with restoration (not net loss),23 
-maintain ecological relationships, 
-maintain populations at greatest net annual increment, 
-restore depleted populations, 
-minimize risk of irreversible change in the marine ecosystem, etc. 
Genetic conservation criteria, when introduced, will make things 
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even more complicated as management will have to face conservation 
requirements at both ecosystem/biodiversity, species and genetic level. 
3.2.4 Improving decision -making process 
In international management. the best principles are useless if the 
decision-making process leading to their practical implementation is 
flawed and inefficient. The quality of the decision-making process is also 
important when criteria and standards have to be agreed on. The 
following section therefore briefly analyses the issue looking at poten- 
tial solutions for improvement. 
In general, fisheries management agreements implicitly accept that 
fishing activities which are not explicitly prohibited or subject to 
regulations may be undertaken freely. Their regulation (including 
prohibition) requires a particular action to be taken. The necessary 
decisions are usually taken by consensus between all parties and voting 
procedures are rarely used, even when they are foreseen by the basic 
texts. In international fora, the consensus procedure allows agreement 
only on the ‘lowest common denominator’ between all parties, gives a 
de-facto right of veto to the minority and has led to the ‘too little, too 
late’ fisheries management. The problem has been stressed by various 
scholars as a weakness in international fora and the introduction of 
majority voting procedures would correct this ~ i t u a t i o n . ’ ~ . ’ ~ . ~ ~ . ~ ~  
When the agreement reached is legally binding, parties are given time 
to object, and if they do so, to opt-out of the procedure because ‘no 
State can be expected to accept limitations on its sovereignty without its 
consent’ even though the opting-out party puts at risk theinterests that 
the others have in virtue of their own so~ereignty.’~ The country which 
does not accept the resulting legal obligation may find it convenient to 
leave the agreement while continuing to fish in the Convention area, 
(Alternatively, vessels from a party to the Convention may move under 
a flag of convenience of a State not party to the Convention in order to 
avoid the obligation contained in the Convention.) Attempts to make 
the right to fish in the high seas subject to complying with UNCLOS 
provisions or to increase flag States liability have, for the moment, met 
with little success. The idea is progressing slowly, however, and the 
issue will be specifically addressed during the forthcoming UN Con- 
ference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
(New York, July 1993) recommended by UNCED in June 1992. 
The concept of ‘people’s participation’ in national resources manage- 
ment is being voiced and increasingly recognized in international fora 
and we can safely assume that the public will be more and more 
associated with and involved in the decision-making process on 
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environment and development issues. In parallel, it is being proposed 
that management agencies, research and industry should be explicitly 
and directly accountable to the public for the state of the resources on 
which they have been given user-rights.20*26 In addition, public opinion 
has been used by environmental protection lobbies for decision-forcing 
and as a test-board for ‘acceptability’ of measures, norms or criteria. 
Actively alerted public opinion has been instrumental, for instance, to 
force an international moratorium on whaling, an international ban on 
large-scale pelagic driftnet and a ban on coastal gillnets in California. 
3.2.5 The concept of ‘best available technology’ 
One requirement of precautionary management or development is to 
use the ‘best available technology’ (a parallel to the concept of ‘best 
scientific evidence available’). This requirement has been made in a 
number of international instruments related to environmental p0licy.7~~ 
This simply means that all that is technologically feasible must be done 
to prevent the harmful effect and little more can be done to make this 
requirement more pre~autionary.~ The application of the concept 
usually implies the establishment of ‘black’ and ‘grey’ or ‘red’, ‘orange’ 
and ‘green’ lists of fishing  practice^.'^ Poison and dynamite (and 
probably large-scale pelagic driftnets) would be in such a black or red 
list. As an example, the Convention on the Conservation of European 
Wildlife and Natural Habitats, Beme, 1979, gives in its annex IV, the 
list of non-selective gears to be banned, which includes nets in general. 
(Although relevant in principle for migratory birds, the Beme Conven- 
tion has been used in Italy in reference to the large-scale pelagic 
driftnet fishery.) 
The potential problem in classifying fishing technologies in such lists 
is illustrated in Thome-Miller and Catena2* (p. 84) who mentions that 
examples of methods that are contributing to depleting marine living 
resources include fishing the deep ocean with huge driftne ts, operating 
large vessels able to process huge catches at sea, using aerial spotters 
and acoustic fish finders to process huge catches at sea, using aerial 
spotters and acoustic fish finders to locate schools of target fish and 
using more and more efficient fishing equipment without restrictions on 
size or location of catch. This shows a total confusion and unjustified 
amalgamate between the lack of selectivity of some gears and the large 
catches which are possible on abundant small pelagic species, as well as 
between fishing efficiency and fishing mortality, forgetting that total 
effort is what is to be controlled. 
The ‘best management methodology’ would be, following the same 
rationale, a concept of value. It is unlikely that any management 
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method would be the best in absolute terms but techniques particularly 
robust and well-adapted to fragile species or communities, in a 
particular socio-economic and cultural context, could be given a ,status 
as standard. 
A criticism of the ‘best available fishing technology’ concept is that 
(a) ‘best’ is defined neither in qualitative nor quantitative terms and (b) 
the accumulation of ‘best technologies’ could be the worst thing 
happening to fish if the total effort is not controlled. The wording 
assumes a universal value judgement on what is ‘best’ without providing 
guidance on the basis for such judgement and the best gear from an 
extreme ecological point of view may be one that catches nothing. The 
General Assembly Resolution 44/228 on UNCED refers to ‘environ- 
mentally sound’ technology in a document which, however, stresses 
abundantly the necessity to take also into account socio-economic 
values as required by the FAO definition on sustainable development. 
3.3 Legal implications 
Although General Assembly resolutions are not legally binding, they 
can have enormous political significance. The consequences of the 
General Assembly resolutions on large-scale pelagic driftnets gave an 
example of the potential impact. Although its legal status is that of a 
recommendation, a UNGA resolution may have an effect wider than 
that in revealing indirectly what State practice is, or pointing to what 
States might be willing to accept. The UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea is in a similar category pending its entry into force (although it 
is considered that parts of the Convention (including the fisheries 
provisions) already constitute customary law even before the entry into 
force of the Convention), though an obligation to act in accordance 
with its provisions can be linked to the need for those States which have 
signed it not to act in a manner contrary to its objects and purposes 
(Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 18). 
These points do not, however, elevate the Precautionary Principle to 
a legal requirement in its own right and Nollkaemper’ indicates that, for 
the time being, the Precautionary Principle is no more than a 
non-binding norm, operating within the framework of particular agree- 
ments. Hey,I7 however, argues that the Principle ‘may be on its way to 
becoming part of customary international law’. 
The Precautionary Principle might, however, be invoked in fisheries 
conservation issues as a factor, indeed a very important factor, in 
negotiations between States to establish conservation measures in 
circumstances where there is an obligation to negotiate in good faith to 
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reach agreement. e.g. with respect to straddling stocks under UNCLOS 
or with respect to high seas fishing under article 119. Given the wide 
support of the Principle in the world community, a State or a party 
which refers objectively to it, directly or indirectly, most probably hopes 
that it cannot be accused of bad faith. The above discussions on the 
Principle show, however, that it may easily lead to abuse. 
u 
i 
4 IMPLEMENTATION OF PRECAUTIONARY APPROACHES 
4.1 Existing precautionary approaches 
Precautionary approaches for fisheries management have long been 
advocated even though they have rarely been applied in practice. 
Preventive (proactive) management has been recommended in order to 
avoid crisis and higher costs in the future. 
This included: (1) step-wise development with impact monitoring as 
opposed to massive development with no accompanying research; ( 2 )  
early effort limitations instead of laissez-faire investment strategies 
which lead to overfishing; (3) design of institutional or financial ‘brakes’ 
to avoid ‘explosive’ development; (4) prior authorization for ordering 
new vessels or borrowing money for them; (5) precautionary quotas for 
species for which proper assessments are not available; (6) using 
‘pessimistic models’ (e.g. the Schaefer production model instead of the 
Fox model or yield-per-recruit models) for stocks where low resilience 
is suspected; (7) recommendations for multispecies management; (8) 
recommendations for ‘experimental management’ to test systems 
respon~e;~  (9) recommendations of development targets below the 
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) e.g. Fo.,, &, FMsy; (10) adoption of 
the concept of ‘safe biological limits’; (11) modelling systems response 
across the whole uncertainty range;*’ (12) agreement on cautious 
management thresholds (e.g. minimum spawning biomass) and course 
of action before crisis O C C U ~ S . ~ ”  
The poor state of the fisheries resources in many areas indicate that 
despite their potential availability, such measures have not been 
adopted widely or successfully implemented. Ways must therefore be 
found to strengthen existing precautionary approaches. 
In case of doubt as to the effect on the marine environment and 
resources, preventive or remedial action would have to be taken, 
decision erring on the safe side. For example, the General Assembly 
U 
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Resolution 44/225 on large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing recommended 
immediate action in the absence of scientific consensus. The generaliza- 
tion of the approach would imply that ‘the prohibition of a disputed 
fishing technique is in order even in the absence of scientific informa- 
tion demonstrating its harmfulness until its harmlessness has been 
demonstrated’ (freely translated from the original, in French)” (p. 637). 
Although the usefulness of this approach can be easily seen in case of 
very high risk, its ordinary application for everyday fisheries manage- 
ment could very quickly discredit the Principle itself. 
Paying lip service to the Principle will not satisfy the growing 
international pressure for more environmentally-friendly technologies 
and development. As Heyzs rightly stresses, what is new in the 
Precautionary Principle is not so much the implied measures themselves 
but the way in which such measures are to be implemented (i.e. 
stringently) and the time at which they are implemented (‘as soon as a 
detrimental effect . . . becomes plausible’). A precautionary fisheries 
management policy may combine a variety of approaches and regula- 
tory tools as follows: 
-Adopting the sustainable development principle as defined by the 
FAO Conference. Specific and shorter-term objectives would have to 
be broadly compatible with it. Hey” argues that not linking explicitly 
environment and development would be contrary to the precautionary 
approach. 
-Adopting the principle of precautionary management. This would 
entail adopting a preventive management approach and the measures 
listed below. The degree of ‘precaution’ (e.g. the amount of constraint 
and the degree of stringency) would be negotiated on a case-by-case 
basis, for each agreement or convention. 
-Using the ‘best scientiJc evidence available’. In most cases fisheries 
impacts are progressive and reversible leading to small risk. There 
should therefore be time available to collect data and build up scientific 
consensus at least on the level of uncertainty. All fisheries should be 
covered by an information system, the complexity and cost of which 
should be commensurate with the level of risk, e.g. higher for long-lived 
species (mammals, sharks, etc.) and in highly unstable resources 
systems, e.g. small pelagic stocks in upwelling areas. 
-Adopting a broader range of management benchmarks and re- 
ference points more directly related to reproduction capacity (safe 
biological limits, minimum spawning biomass, etc.). In particular, using 
such reproductive capacity as the system status indicator and explicit 
management target. 
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potential impacts of developments. These criteria would take into 
account, inter alia, the potential degree of impact on the reproduction 
capacity of the target and non-target species, the level of risk to the 
stock and associated species caused by the combination of fishing and 
environment variability, the degree of reversibility of the observed or 
forecasted impacts. In particular, criteria will be needed for ecosystem 
management and acceptable degrees of ecosystem disturbance for the 
various types of ecosystems presently exploited. 
-Taking a risk-averse stand: assessing the degree of risk created by 
ongoing fishing activities; establishing maximum rates of exploitation, 
based on acceptable levels of impacts; requiring an environmental 
impact assessment before authorizing any increase of fishing intensity 
beyond such rates; requiring prior environmental assessment before 
opening a new fishery (as required by some pressure groups) implies 
that all resources are put under a management scheme of various 
degrees of stringency and sophistication, without exception. Such risk 
can, in theory, be assessed by simulation of management systems as 
already done for the management of whalesz9 but the degree of 
complexity will increase drastically for multispecies and ecosystem 
management and with the inclusion of socio-economic considerations. 
-Agreeing on acceptable levels of impacts (and risk). They will never 
be nil and their ‘acceptability’ will be influenced by cultural, historical 
and socio-economic conditions. Different pressure groups, with 
different interests, will disagree on the degree of risk which is 
‘acceptable’. Negotiations between interest groups, and within an 
appropriate institutional and legislative framework will be necessary. 
Without them, the degree of compliance will be low, raising the related 
costs of enforcement beyond acceptable levels. The bargaining that 
characterized past management practices will therefore still be neces- 
sary. The difference and strength of the new approach is that the 
process would be more formalized and trade-offs more explicit and 
transparent to public opinion. 
-Basing management decisions on combined stresses on resources 
and environment. This implies that effort reductions or special mea- 
sures affecting fisheries will be taken when the stock will face unusually 
unfavourable environmental conditions. One implication that would 
prevent fishermen from being penalized by environmental degradation 
from other human activities is to insert fisheries in the context of coastal 
integrated management. 
-Improving management response time by adopting ‘action- 
triggering levels’ for status variables (e.g. reproductive capacity, risk 
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pre-defined directions agreed beforehand. This would particularly be 
required for highly variable resources such as small pelagic species in 
upwelling systems and for depleted resources in a process of rebuilding 
and confronted with environmental variability. 
-Improving participation of ‘non -fishery users’ in fisheries manage- 
ment bodies as a way to open a more constructive dialogue and take all 
interests into account when developing and managing fisheries. This 
requires more ‘transparency’ in fisheries management and better 
reporting procedures on status of stocks to the public. 
--Improving decision -making procedures by introducing voting proc- 
edures or using them when they already exist. 
-Introducing prior consultation procedures for fishing activities listed 
in the ‘grey’ or ‘orange’ list. This would require that States proposing to 
introduce such activity present a report, comparable to an EIA report 
for comments. Hey2-’ warns, however, of the paperwork that might be 
involved if such procedures are used too often and suggests limiting the 
procedure to activities for which phasing out has been decided and to 
request an annual report during the phasing out period. 
-Strengthening monitoring, control and surveillance and raising 
penalties to deterrent levels. 
The type of action and the degree of urgency required must be a 
function of the probability of occurrence of a certain type of impact of a 
certain magnitude. Decisions are comparatively easy when risks are 
,extremely high. Proposing to prohibit, even without any scientific 
background, the use of explosives to fish in the high seas would 
probably not meet with much international opposition as harmful 
fisheries techniques (dynamite, poison) are normally banned in all 
national fisheries legislation. However, deciding whether a 5% by-catch 
of sharks in a longline tuna fishery is acceptable or not will require 
more careful consideration. 
More stringent measures could and would probably be advocated by 
extremists as necessary for the implementation of a precautionary 
approach but that would probably be considered unrealistic from both 
the technical, socio-economic and political points of view. Nollkaemper’ 
states that a strict interpretation of the Principle would render it 
meaningless in practice. In fisheries, extreme measures would include, 
for instance: 
-banning of all activities which affect negatively the environment 
-requiring proof of harmlessness before starting any fishery, a 
(implying the closing down of all fisheries), 
requirement obviously impossible to meet, 
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-requesting that the most advanced techniques be systematically 
applied by all member States. 
5 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Many environmentalists are beginning to understand ‘and stress the 
need for managing the combination of natural and socio-economic 
systems, but it is not clear that they have reached the point of 
cost-benefit analysis or widely adopted a problem-solving approach in a 
social milieu’.33 On the other hand, industry must also start to 
understand that the spiral of short-term economic and social problems 
created by a lack of control, the rates of harvest and the pursuit of 
short-term economic goals cannot continue to justify the erosion of the 
resources and the environment at the expense of the present and future 
generations. 
The Precautionary Principle appears both as a golden opportunity for 
better management and a threat to fisheries industries; as part of a 
safeguard of the opportunities of future generations and as a potential 
source of inequity for those of today. It is therefore important that 
misunderstanding and extremism are avoided. The problem should not 
be expressed in terms of a drastic choice between a standpoint of 
extreme ecological conservationism and one of total liberalism (ter- 
minology taken and freely translated from Savin3’). Between these two 
unrealistic extremes lies an area of possibilities and opportunities for 
mankind, requiring balance, dialogue and mutual understanding, as well 
as significant changes in decision-making and legal frameworks. 
UNCLOS already imposed the concepts of MSY and optimum 
utilization and referred to the need to take into account the reproduc- 
tive needs of species associated with or dependent upon harvested 
species. It did not impose on coastal States the heavy burden of proof 
before action could be taken even if it did not give much guidance on 
how to build consensus (apart from broadly referring to cooperation) 
and how to act if consensus could not be reached. This and the fact that 
precautionary techniques have always been available in the fisheries 
management tool-box lead us to conclude, with Nollkaemper’ and 
that the direction of the methods required under the Precaution- 
ary Principle is not a new one. 
Instead of introducing a fundamental change, the Precautionary 
Principle follows and stresses the trend towards more environmental 
c 
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concern already expressed. for instance. in the FAO Technical Con- 
ference on Fisheries in Vancouver (Canada) in 1 9 7 P  and in the FAO 
World Conference on Fisheries Development and Management, Rome, 
1984. It puts the focus more clearly on uncertainty and related hidden 
costs of present decisions for future generations. It is promoted as a 
means to ensure inter-generational equity but, if incorrectly applied, is 
an attempt to re-allocate resources to non-consumptive users, often 
without much reference or concern towards intra-generational equity or 
scientific objectivity. 
The Principle underlines a growing consensus on the approaches to 
be taken. Its implicit extension to fisheries emphasizes the growing 
awareness that fisheries management cannot be seen in isolation and 
must fit an integrated context which satisfies the requirement for 
long-term resources sustainability and environmental conservation. The 
trend is particularly striking in the coastal areas where the concept of 
Integrated Coastal Areas Management and Development (ICAM) is 
developing extremely rapidly. The psychological importance of coining 
a new term should not be underestimated and, as Nollkaempfer’ points 
out, if this term is perceived by policy-makers as carrying with it the 
feeling of urgency and of the need to take drastic preventive measures, 
it may be effective where traditional jargon failed. 
No matter how irritating environmental constraints may be, a 
responsible approach is required for at least two good reasons. First, it 
is required for the long-term survival of the economic activity. Second, 
taking the USA as an example, commercial fishermen represent 1% of 
the voters while recreational fishermen represent 20% of the 
The ‘public’ pressure, triggered by environmental (or pseudo- 
environmental) considerations could therefore lead to actual shifts in 
resources allocation to user-groups considered, rightly or wrongly, as 
environmentally safer. It is important to stress here, with Miles” and 
Sumi9’ that the principles and criteria adopted to solve the high seas 
problems will, most probably, end up also in national law inside EEZS. 
Following the recommendation of its member countries, FAO will 
develop guidelines for Responsible Fishing. The International Con- 
ference on Responsible Fishing (Cancún, Mexico, May 1992), organized 
by Mexico in close consultation with FAO, recognized the need for 
such a comprehensive and balanced concept of sustainable utilization of 
fisheries resources in harmony with the environment. The concept 
intends to promote fishery practices compatible with the requirements 
of ecosystems, ocean resources and consumers (food quality) and the 
guidelines needed for its implementation will have to give due 
consideration to the need for precautionary approaches. 
’ 
8 . 
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